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NOTES
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR
TO CASES INVOLVING BURSTING BOTTLES
I. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
A. INTRODUCTION.
The past few decades have seen the rise of considerable litiga-
tion concerning injuries to persons resulting from bursting
or exploding bottles. Almost without exception the bottle which
bursts is one which contains some form of carbonated beverage.
In order to recover from the manufacturer, a person so injured
is confronted with a serious proof problem. A warranty by
the manufacturer is generally not implied in law in this type
of case. In most instances plaintiff cannot recover in contract,
since there is ordinarily no privity between plaintiff and de-
fendant. Plaintiff's only hope for recovery, then, lies in an
action for negligence. It is here that the difficulty arises. The
reason is quite simple. Normally, when a prospective plaintiff
purchases a bottle containing a carbonated beverage, the manu-
facturer has nothing to do with the transaction, nor do any
of his agents. In most cases the prospective defendant has
transferred the bottle to another party, who in turn has trans-
ferred it to the plaintiff. Usually considerable time has elapsed.
The bottle then explodes, and the plaintiff is injured. But at
the precise moment of the injury, the defendant was not on
the scene, nor did defendant commit any specific act of negli-
gence at the time of, or just prior to, the explosion. The de-
fendant will be liable only if the plaintiff can show negligence
on the part of the defendant, and since the plaintiff can show
no negligence at the time of the injury, he must show some
former negligent act which was the cause of the subsequent
injury. Here again, however, the plaintiff will have difficulties.
If there was any negligent act on the part of the bottling com-
pany, that negligent act was committed while the bottle was
under the exclusive control of the bottler. No bottling company
is anxious to incur liability and it generally comes into court
fortified with expert testimony tending to show that its methods
are those generally used throughout the trade, that they ex-
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emplify the use of reasonable care, and that it is scientifically
inconceivable that one of its bottles could explode in the ab-
sence of a negligent act of the plaintiff or of some third party.
Since the plaintiff is ordinarily unable to prove a specific
negligent act, he can recover only if some special doctrine is
available to him. The doctrine which he invokes is that of res
ipsa loquitur. In order to place the problem presented here in
its proper perspective, a brief general discussion of that doctrine
is essential.
B. RES IPSA LOQUITUR EXPLAINED.
Res ipsa loquitur is merely one type of circumstantial evi-
dence, which, in turn, is evidence of a fact, or set of facts, from
which the existence of another fact (the fact to be proved)
may reasonably be inferred. Dean Prosser points out that'
The statement of this doctrine most often quoted is that
of Chief Justice Erle in 1865 :2
'There must be reasonable evidence of negligence; but
where the thing is shown to be under the management of
the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as
in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those
who have the management use proper care, if affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the
defendants, that the accident arose from want of care.'3
From a careful examination of the above definition of the
res ipsa doctrine, at least three prerequisites to its application
become evident:
1. An accident which is peculiar in its nature, so that it
would not normally occur in the absence of negligence.
2. Exclusive control by the defendant.
3. Absence of control by the plaintiff.4
Some courts add a fourth prerequisite, namely, that evidence
as to the true explanation of the accident must be more acces-
sible to the defendant than to the plaintiff.5
1. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 293 (1941).
2. Scott v. London and St. Katherine Docks Co., 3 H. & C. 596, 159 Eng.
Rep. 665 (1865).
3. Ibid.
4. PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 291.
5. This requisite to the application of the res ipsa doctrine has not been
applied by the majority of courts. Wigmore seems to favor its presence as
a condition precedent to an application of res ipsa:
It may be added that the peculiar force and justice of the rule (Res
Ipsa Loquitur) ... consists in the circumstance that the chief evidence
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1951/iss2/5
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1. Peculiar Nature of the Accident.
The requisite that the accident must be one which would not
ordinarily happen without negligence is, of course, only another
way of stating a rule of circumstantial evidence, that is, that
the accident in itself gives rise to an inference of negligence.
Many accidents occur where no one is at fault. To these res
ipsa will not apply. On the other hand, some accidents "bespeak
negligence," and to these res ipsa will be applicable. Prosser
relates a rather humorous example:6
We can imagine no reason why, with ordinary care, human
toes could not be left out of chewing tobacco, and if toes
are found in chewing tobacco, it seems to us that somebody
has been very careless. 7
It is important to test the particular facts of each accident in
determining whether res ipsa should be applied. The above
quotation gives an obvious example of proper application of
the doctrine. Other cases are not so clear. All that is necessary
is that a reasonable man could say that it is more likely than
not that the accident was caused by negligence.
2. Exclusive Control By the Defendant.
The purpose of this requisite to the application of res ipsa is
.. to focus the inference of negligence upon the defendant."8
An application of res ipsa gives rise to an inference of negli-
of the true cause ... is practically accessible to him (defendant) but
inaccessible to the injured person (plaintiff). [9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2509 (3d. ed. 1940) ]
Prosser, on the other hand, severely criticises the use of this requisite to
an application of res ipsa:
It is difficult to regard this factor as anything more than a make-
weight, or to believe that it ever can be controlling. If the circum-
stances are such as to create a reasonable inference of negligence, it
cannot be supposed that the inference ever would be defeated by a
showing that the defendant knew nothing about what had happened;
and if the facts give rise to no such inference, a plaintiff who has the
burden of proof in the first instance could scarcely make out a case
merely by proving that he knew less about the matter than his ad-
versary.
[PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 301 (1941)]
It would seem that Prosser's view is the more convincing. The fact that
defendant knows more about the causative factors in a res ipso case might
well be said to have been more a reason for a development of the doctrine;
but the presence, or absence of this factor should never determine finally the
rights of the parties with respect to the applicability of the res ipsa
doctrine.
6. Pillars v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 117 Miss. 490, 78 So. 365 (1918).
7. Id. at 500, 78 So. at 366.
8. PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 298.
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gence. However, to result in liability, the facts must point to
the defendant as the negligent party. If the defendant has
control over the instrumentality causing the accident (the bottle
in reference to this discussion), the inference of negligence
may be more certainly fixed upon him. However, the use of
the word "control" here may effect ambiguity. Courts often
confuse the issue as to whether the requirement is that the
defendant be in control of the instrumentality at the time of
the injury, or at the time the negligent act which brought about
the injury was committed. It is especially important in dis-
cussing the bursting bottle cases that this ambiguity be elimi-
nated, since at the time of the accident the bottle is nearly
always in the control of the plaintiff. In applying res ipsa,
it is sufficient, or should be, that the defendant have the con-
trol at the time the negligence occurred.9 If the defendant has
control of all the factors which have apparently caused the
accident, whether he has actual possession and control at the
time of the accident is immaterial, and this second requisite
is fulfilled.1
3. Absence of Control By the Plaintiff.
This requirement is, of course, the mere converse of the
previous one. Its reason for existence is to eliminate the possi-
bility that the plaintiff may have been responsible for the acci-
dent. Obviously this requisite is not to be interpreted rigidly.
In many cases the plaintiff will be doing some act in connection
with the instrumentality causing the accident. In the bursting
bottle cases the plaintiff will usually have possession of the
bottle. But no difficulty will arise in interpreting this condi-
tion if it is remembered that the plaintiff need only prove him-
self free from negligence when the accident occurs, even though
he may be in possession and control of the bottle.1
4. Evidence More Readily Accessible to the Defendant
Than to the Plaintiff.
A few courts have said that a plaintiff seeking the benefit of
the res ipsa doctrine must show that evidence of the true cause
of the accident must be more readily accessible to defendant
9. Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11. Id. at 300.
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than to plaintiff. This doctrine has been severely criticised by
some who say that, if the other requisites are met, and an
inference of negligence arises, it should not matter to whom
the evidence is available. However, the courts often speak of
this requisite, and some courts demand its presence as a condi-
tion precedent to the application of the doctrine. 12
C. THE PROCEDURAL EFFECT OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR.
Most courts regard an application of res ipsa loquitur as
nothing more than a form of circumstantial evidence which
creates an inference of negligence. It is important to remember
that the jury is not compelled, in most cases, to accept the
inference, i.e., the inference is permissive and not mandatory.
A few courts, on the other hand, treat the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine as one which raises a rebuttable presumption of negli-
gence. A New Jersey court 3 has ably explained the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine:
That the facts of the occurrence warrant the inference of
negligence, not that they compel such an inference; that
they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence where
direct evidence of it may be lacking, but it is evidence to
be weighed, not necessarily to be accepted as sufficient; that
they [the facts] call for an explanation or rebuttal, not
necessarily that they require it; that they make a case to
be decided by the jury, not that they forestall the verdict.
Res ipsa loquitur where it applies does not convert the
defendant's issue into an affirmative defense. When all
the evidence is in, the question for the jury is whether the
preponderance is with the plaintiff. 4
An application of the res ipsa doctrine should not shift either
the burden of producing evidence or the burden of persuasion
to the defendant. The plaintiff must still show, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that the defendant was negligent. The
plaintiff is merely entitled to an instruction to the jury that
it may, if it so chooses, infer from the fact of the accident that
the defendant was negligent, even though plaintiff has intro-
duced no evidence of specific acts of negligence.
12. See note 5 supra.
13. Markowitz v. Liebert & Obert, 23 N.J. Misc. 281, 43A.2d 794
(Sup. Ct. 1945).
14. Id. at 284, 43 A.2d at 797.
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We may now consider the applicability of the doctrine in con-
nection with cases involving injury as a result of the bursting or
exploding of a bottle.
II. GENERAL INAPPLICABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE IN
CASES OF BURSTING BOTTLES
There is much diversity of opinion as to just what the plain-
tiff need show to be entitled to the court's application of res
ipsa loquitur. As was mentioned, the applicability of the doc-'
trine depends upon the facts peculiar to each case. This rule
is especially important here.
In general, a mere showing that a bottle burst, and that the
plaintiff was injured thereby, will not merit an application of
the doctrine. Almost without exception the courts require a
plaintiff to show more. The balance of this note will be devoted
to a discussion of what further facts must be shown.
III. THE REQUISITES OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR
AS APPLIED TO BURSTING BOTTLE CASES
While the main divisions herein used are doctrinal, the in-
ternal grouping of cases within those divisions is factual. The
doctrinal divisions correspond to the general requisites for the
application of the doctrine.
A. NATURE OF THE ACCIDENT; AN ACCIDENT ORDINARILY THE
RESULT OF NEGLIGENCE.
In general, the courts are in agreement that the explosion of a
bottle containing an ordinarily harmless beverage is an accident
which would normally not happen without negligence on the
part of someone. In Payne v. Rome Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,15
defendant had relinquished control over a bottle, and it later
exploded, injuring the plaintiff. Plaintiff offered proof of the
absence of negligence on his part as well as on the part of all
others who handled the bottle except the defendant; however,
plaintiff offered no proof of specific acts of negligence by the
defendant. The Georgia Court of Appeals, in reversing the
trial court's order granting a non-suit, declared:
If the plaintiff can recover at all, he can do so only upon an
application of the maxim 'res ipsa loquitur.' The occurrence
15. 10 Ga. App. 762, 73 S.E. 1087 (1912).
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was unusual. Bottles filled with a harmless beverage do
not ordinarily explode. When they do, an inference of
negligence somewhere and in somebody may arise. There
is no presumption of law, but merely an inference of fact.
[Italics added] .16
A similar position has been taken by the Supreme Court of
Arkansas :27
. a sound bottle of carbonated water, or other charged
liquid prepared for human consumption would not ordi-
narily burst if carefully handled. If such a bottle contain-
ing liquid under pressure does explode . . ., it is probable
that the bottler charged it excessively, failed to discover
a flaw in the bottle or cap, or was otherwise negligent in
preparing it.1"
It is especially important to remember that the accident need
only be such that would not ordinarily happen in the absence
of negligence. 9 It is not necessary that the possibility of un-
avoidable accident be ruled out completely. Such a requirement
would be unrealistic, because it could never be met.
B. AND C. EXCLUSIVE CONTROL BY THE DEFENDANT AND
ABSENCE OF CONTROL BY THE PLAINTIFF.
Since these two requisites are each the converse of the other,
they will be discussed together. The following factual categori-
zation seems appropriate:
1. Cases where the exploding bottle was in the exclusive
management and control of the defendant at the time of
the accident.
2. Cases where the bottle was out of the management and
control of the defendant, but where neither the plaintiff
nor anyone else had done anything to cause the accident,
and the plaintiff so shows.
3. Cases where the bottle was out of the defendant's con-
trol, but where plaintiff makes no affirmative showing
that neither he nor anyone else besides defendant has
mishandled it.
4. Cases where the bottle was out of the defendant's con-
trol, and where there is evidence tending to show a
negligent mishandling of the bottle by the plaintiff or by
someone else besides the defendant.
16. Id. at 763, 73 S.E. at 1087.
17. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fort Smith, Ark. v. Hicks, 215 Ark. 803,
223 S.W.2d 762 (1949).
18. Id. at 806, 223 S.W.2d at 764.
19. Stolle v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 307 Mo. 520, 271 S.W. 497 (1925).
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1. There are few cases of bottles exploding or bursting and
causing injury to a plaintiff where the defendant manufacturer
is in absolutely exclusive control of the bottle. However, it is
safe to say that res ipsa loquitur applies in such a case. In
Riecke v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Association,20 plaintiff was
injured and permanently scarred when a bottle of defendant's
beer exploded. Plaintiff, upon invitation of the defendant, was
making a tour of inspection of defendant's plant. The St. Louis
Court of Appeals held the following instruction to the jury to
be correct:
The jury were instructed that, if they believed from the
evidence that, whilst plaintiff was in the plant, a bottle
filled with liquid, which was being handled by one of de-
fendant's servants exploded and a piece of glass struck
and injured plaintiff, and that the contents of said bottle
were manufactured and placed in said bottle by defendant,
the law presumes that the explosion of the bottle and the
consequent injury to plaintiff was caused by defendant's
negligence, and that the verdict should be for plaintiff,
unless the jury should find that, notwithstanding this pre-
sumption, said explosion and injury to plaintiff was not
caused by negligence on the part of defendant. 21
In the Riecke case the plaintiff merely attempted to prove
general negligence on the part of the defendant by showing the
facts of the accident and the injury; no evidence of specific
negligence was offered. The court applied the res ipsa doctrine,
and the plaintiff recovered. The same reasoning and result
are found in Markowitz v. Liebert and Obert,22 where plaintiff
was leaning over to pick up a case of defendant's beer, at de-
fendant's plant, and a bottle exploded. In these cases the courts
find that the accident suggests negligence, and since defendant
is in full control of the bottle at the time of the accident, such
negligence is easily focused upon him.
2. Where the defendant has released his control over the bottle
which exploded, but where the plaintiff shows that he, the
plaintiff, has not done anything to cause the explosion and that
no one else has, the majority of the courts give the plaintiff the
benefit of the res ipsa doctrine. Such cases may be divided into
two groups: (a) those where the bottle has just recently been
20. 206 Mo. App. 246, 227 S.W. 631 (1921).
21. Id. at 248, 227 S.W. at 632.
22. 23 N.J. Misc. 281, 43 A.2d 794 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
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released from defendant's control, and no one has handled it
since, and it explodes; (b) those (cases) where the defendant
has relinquished control prior to the explosion, where plaintiff
or others have handled the bottle, but where the plaintiff affirma-
tively shows that no one has mishandled it after defendant re-
linquished control and before the explosion.
(a) In Brunskill v. Farabi,23 defendant's servant, while acting
within the scope of his employment, delivered a case of Pepsi-
Cola to plaintiff's shop, and placed it under a counter. Later,
no one else having touched the bottles, one blew up and injured
plaintiff as she was bending over to remove bottles from the
case. Plaintiff brought suit, introduced as evidence the facts
of the accident, but offered no proof of specific acts of negli-
gence by defendant, thus relying wholly upon the res ipsa
doctrine. The court, holding for the plaintiff, stated that the
trial court properly instructed the jury that "such facts, if you
find them to be true, are sufficient circumstantial evidence to
warrant a finding by you that the explosion, if any, . . . was
caused by the defendant's negligence. ' 24 So also, in Bradley V.
Conway Springs Bottling Co.,25 under almost identical circum-
stances, the Kansas Supreme Court applied res ipsa, since, as
the court said:
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is not limited to cases where
the injurious agency is in the control of the defendant at
the time of the injury, but it is sufficient that such agency
was in defendant's control at the time of the negligent act
which caused the injury. 6
The plaintiff, by showing that no one besides defendant touched
the bottle before the explosion, was entitled to the benefit of the
doctrine. The applicability of the doctrine in cases of this
particular natui/e is amply supported.27
23. 181 S.W.2d 549 (Mo. App. 1944).
24. Id. at 551.
25. 154 Kan. 282, 118 P.2d 601 (1941).
26. Bradley v. Conway Springs Bottling Co., 154 Kan. 282, 287, 118
P.2d 601, 604 (1941).
27. Hoffing v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 87 Cal. App.2d 371, 197 P.2d 56
(1948); Groves v. Fla. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 40 So.2d 128 (Fla. 1949);
Ortego et al. v. Nehi Bottling Wks., et al., 199 La. 599, 6 So.2d 677 (1942);
Macres v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Mich. 567, 287 N.W. 922 (1939);
Stevens v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of St. Louis, 215 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. App.
1948); Boykin v. Chase Bottling Wks., 222 S.W.2d 889 (Tenn. App. 1949);
Joly v. Jones, 55 A.2d 181 (Vt. 1947).
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(b) Where the plaintiff or others have handled the bottle
after defendant has relinquished control and before the accident,
plaintiff will be entitled to the benefit of a res ipsa instruction
to the jury if he shows that no one aside from the defendant
has negligently mishandled the bottle. The Arkansas Supreme
Court has stated the majority rule clearly and concisely:
When a plaintiff shows that an exploding bottle was handled
with due care after it left the control of the defendant, and
that the bottle had not been subject to extraneous harm-
ful forces during that time, res ipsa loquitur applies.28
And in Payne v. Rome Coca-Cola Bottling Co.l 9 the Court of
Appeals of Georgia said:
When an action is brought to recover damages for an in-
jury caused from the explosion of a bottle, the contents
of which were manufactured, bottled, and sold by the de-
fendant as a harmless beverage, an inference of negligence
on the part of the manufacturer arises, when it is shown
that all the persons through whose hands the bottle had
passed were free from fault, and that the condition of the
bottle and its contents had not been changed since it left
defendant's possession."
When the plaintiff or others have handled the bottle after
it has left the control of the defendant, the plaintiff, in order to
focus the inference of negligence upon the defendant, diverts
the inference from himself or anyone else by showing that the
bottle was at all times handled with reasonable care after the
defendant gave up control. If the plaintiff does this successfully,
the weight of authority allows him the benefit of the res ipsa
doctrine.3' Obviously, in those jurisdictions, if the facts show
28. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fort Smith, Ark. v. Hicks, 215 Ark. 803,
805, 223 S.W.2d 762, 764 (1949).
29. 10 Ga. App. 762, 73 S.E. 1087 (1912).
30. Payne v. Rome Coca-Cola Co., 10 Ga. App. 762, 73 S.E. 1087 (1912).
31. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) ;
McClelland v. Acme Brewing Co. et al., 92 Cal. App.2d 698, 207 P.2d 591(1949) ; Canada Dry Ginger Ale Co., Inc. v. Jochum, 43 A.2d 42 (D.C. App.
1945); Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Danneman, 25 Ga. App. 43, 102
S.E. 542 (1920); Georgia-Alabama Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. White, 55
Ga. App. 706, 191 S.E. 265 (1937); Mabee et al. v. Sutliff and Case, 335
Ill. App. 353, 82 N.E.2d 63 (1948) ; Auzenne v. Gulf Pub. Service Co., 188
So. 512 (La. App. 1939) ; Lanza v. DeRidder Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 3 So.2d
217 (La. App. 1941); Cole v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 15 So.2d 543 (La.
App. 1941); Boucher v. La. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 46 So.2d 701 (La. App.
1950); Stolle v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 307 Mo. 520, 271 S.W. 497 (1925);
Counts v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of St. Louis, 149 S.W.2d 418 (Mo. App.
1941) ; Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Crane, 211 N.C. 567, 190 S.E. 879
(1937); Fick v. Pilsener Brewing Co., 39 Ohio App. 158, 86 N.E.2d 616
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that no one has handled the bottle at all after it left the de-
fendant's control, it is not incumbent on plaintiff to negative
mishandling. The facts themselves are such that no additional
proof is necessary to focus the inference of negligence on the
defendant.
Few cases hold that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not
applicable where plaintiff has focused the inference of negli-
gence upon the defendant, either by merely proving the facts
of the case (as discussed in [a]), or by affirmatively proving
that no one besides defendant has been negligent (as discussed
in [b]). Only one of these cases holds unequivocably that (1)
res ipsa is inapplicable, and (2) therefore, plaintiff has failed
to make out a prima facie case. In Stodder v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Plants,32 plaintiff was injured while opening a bottle of coke
which exploded just after it was delivered by defendant. Plain-
tiff showed affirmatively that the bottle was not handled im-
properly after it left defendant's control. Refusing to apply
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the court in holding for de-
fendant said:
We hold that evidence of the breaking of a bottle, after
the bottle has left the control of the defendant, and without
proof of any other circumstances indicating failure on the
part of the defendant to use due care, is not sufficient to
make out a prima facie case of negligence. 33
The court indicated that the plaintiff, in order to maintain his
action, must show specific acts of negligence by the defendant.
A recent Missouri case has caused some difficulty. In Maybach
v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.,34 plaintiff was injured by the ex-
ploding of two bottles of defendant brewing corporation's beer
while plaintiff was removing them from a shelf in a Kroger
store. Plaintiff brought an action to recover for her injuries,
joining the Brewing Company and Kroger's. Plaintiff proved
that neither she nor anyone else mishandled the bottles after
they passed out of the control of the Brewing Company. The
(1949); Winfree v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 20 Tenn. App, 615, 103
S.W.2d 33 (1937); Stroud v. Brands Punch Syrup Co. et al., 205 S.W.2d
618 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); Honea v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 143 Tex.
272, 183 S.W.2d 968 (1944); Berkendorfer et al. v. Garrett et al., 143
S.W.2d 1020 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
32. 142 Me. 139, 48 A.2d 622 (1946).
33. Stodder v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, 142 Me. 139, 42 A.2d 622
(1946).
34. 359 Mo. 446, 222 S.W.2d 87 (1949).
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Brewing Company appealed from an order sustaining plaintiff's
motion for new trial as to the Brewing Company. The Supreme
Court of Missouri affirmed the order granting a new trial. In
so doing they rejected appellant's contention that plaintiff had
to recover on the res ipsa theory or not at all, and that since
this was not a proper case for the application of that doctrine,
plaintiff must lose.
The courts agreed with appellant that this was not a res ipsa
case. They said:
It is generally held that the doctrine [res ipsa loquitur]
is inapplicable unless the control or right (and duty) of
control of the instrumentality causing the injury is in de-
fendant at the time of the injury, although some cases hold
that it is sufficient to prove that the instrumentality was
in the possession and control of the defendant at the time
fhe negligent act was committed, together with further
proof of the absence of any cause intervening between
the negligent act and the injury.3
In the course of the opinion, the court recognized that the
rules laid down in two earlier Missouri cases-0 were in conflict
with that laid down in the instant case. In those cases, said
the court, the res ipsa doctrine was overextended in that it was
held to be applicable if plaintiff could show exclusive control in
defendant at the time of the negligent act plus no later mis-
handling by anyone. The court thought that it was essential to
the application of the doctrine that the inference of negligence
be directed toward the defendant by the facts of the accident
alone, without any additional evidence of no mishandling later
by other persons, and that requisite could be met only by a
showing of defendant's exclusive control at the time of the
accident.37
However, in answer to defendant's contention, supra, the
court went on to say that the results in the earlier cases were
correct, and, furthermore, that plaintiff had made out a prima
facie case in the instant case. The reason given was that while
lack of exclusive control in the defendant at the time of the
accident negatives the use of the res ipsa doctrine, nevertheless
35. Maybach v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 359 Mo. 466, 453, 222 S.W.2d 87,
89 (1949).
36. Stolle v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 307 Mo. 520, 271 S.W. 497 (1925);
Counts v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 149 S.W.2d 418 (Mo. App. 1941).
37. Maybach v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 359 Mo. 446, 452, 222 S.W.2d 87,
90 (1949).
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in this type of case plaintiff may recover on a general negli-
gence theory by the use of circumstantial evidence to prove, not
specific acts of negligence, but general negligence. Apparently
no proof of anything more than the facts of the accident plus
the lack of mishandling by someone other than defendant is
needed. 38
It is thus manifest that whatever the theory, the results are
the same. The court seems moved to lay down a somewhat
broader principle of recovery, based on a willingness to go a
long way toward letting a plaintiff prove his case by circum-
stantial evidence of general negligence only. That willingness
is apparently due to two things (a) a realization that as a
practical matter it is very likely that defendant was somehow
at fault, and (b) that evidence of specific acts of neglience being
peculiarly unavailable to the plaintiff, he could never recover
for serious injuries for which the defendant probably ought
to be responsible, without some help in proving his case. Thus
the court says:
Where, from the nature of the case, the plaintiff ... could
not be expected to know the exact causes of the precise
negligent act which became the cause of the injury, and
the facts were particularly within the knowledge of the
defendant, the plaintiff is not required to allege the par-
ticular cause. . . . Under the circumstances of this case,
the facts concerning the manufacture of the beer and the
inspection and charging of the bottles being peculiarly
within the knowledge of the defendant, we think the peti-
tion charges general negligence with as much particularity
as should be expected.3 9
Returning once more to those cases which refuse to apply res
ipsa loquitur in spite of plaintiff's having negatived negligence
by himeslf or anyone besides defendant, the remaining cases
seem to be distinguishable from those arbitrarily refusing to
apply the doctrine. In Curley v. Ruppert,40 where defendant
delivered cases of beer to plaintiff's store, and no one touched
them until one bottle exploded, certainly no one mishandled
the bottle in question after it left the defendant's control. The
New York Court of Appeals refused to apply res ipsa. However,
it was shown that the bottle had been at plaintiff's store for
38. Id. at 456, 222 S.W.2d at 92.
39. Ibid.
40. 272 App. Div. 441, 71 N.Y. Supp. 578 (1st Dep't. 1947).
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three days. Also it was shown that fragments of the bottle had
been retained by plaintiff, but that plaintiff had done nothing to
have these fragments analyzed to ascertain whether or not the
bottle was defective. The court felt that since plaintiff might
well have had the opportunity to prove specific acts of negli-
gence by defendant, plaintiff should not be allowed to reap the
benefits of res ipsa. This is a further indication that relative
accessibility of evidence may play a more important part in
determining the applicability of the doctrine than is ordinarily
thought to be the case. In other cases courts have not arbitrarily
held res ipsa inapplicable, but have shown that the plaintiff had
sufficiently proved specific acts of negligence. 41
It may be safely assumed then, that where the plaintiff has
satisfied the court that neither he nor anyone else has done
anything to change the condition of the bottle after it has left
the defendant's control and up to the time of the explosion, the
great majority of the courts allow the plaintiff the benefit of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. This rule applies where the
explosion occurs immediately after the bottle leaves defendant's
control (in which case plaintiff need not show affirmative evi-
dence of absence of contributory negligence, since the facts
speak for themselves) ; the rule applies equally as well where
the bottle has been handled by persons other than defendant,
but where plaintiff has shown by affirmative proof that no one
mishandled the bottles.
3. It now becomes necessary to examine those cases where the
plaintiff merely proves the facts of the accident, and, without
affirmatively showing that neither he nor anyone else did any-
thing to cause the explosion, relies on the doctrine of res ipsa.
As might be expected in the light of the previous discussion
the majority of the courts hold the doctrine inapplicable in
a case of this type. The rule is well stated in Canada Dry
Ginger Ale, Inc. v. Fisher:42
41. In Coylar v. Little Rock Bottling Works, 114 Ark. 140, 169 S.W. 810
(1914), where plaintiff showed that on numerous former occasions defen-
dant had overcharged bottles, held, this evidence was sufficient to send
the case to the jury on the question of general negligence. And in Naumanm
v. Wekle Brewing Co., 127 Conn. 44, 15 A.2d 181 (1940), where plaintiff
showed bottle was defective, held, this evidence, along with evidence that
no one mishandled the bottle after it left defendant's possession and con-
trol, was sufficient to sustain a cause of action for general negligence.
42. 201 P.2d 245 (Okla. 1948).
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The doctrine of 'res ipsa loquitur' is inapplicable to the
bursting of a bottle of carbonated beverage after it has
passed from the bottler into the hands of third parties,
where the record is silent as to how the beverage was
handled after it leaves the possession of the bottler until
received by the retailer. 43
In the Canadta Dry case, defendant delivered bottles of its
sparkling water to plaintiff, and six months later, when plaintiff
attempted to pick up one of the bottles, it exploded, lacerating
plaintiff's arm. Plaintiff sued, relying wholly upon res ipsa.
The court denied recovery, saying that while the accident may
well have been attributed to the negligence of someone, plaintiff
had not sufficiently focused negligence upon the defendant.
In Roper v. Dad's Root geer Co.,44 plaintiff was a customer in
a self-service market. While he was walking by a counter where
bottles of defendant's root beer were standing, one of the bottles
exploded and injured plaintiff. When plaintiff's case reached
the Illinois intermediate appellate courts it was held that res
ipsa could be applied where the instrumentality causing the acci-
dent was out of the possession and control of the defendant,
so long as the defendant had possession and control of it at
the time the negligent act was committed. However, the court
said that in order to fix negligence, if any, upon defendant in
such a case,
It is a condition precedent to recovery that plaintiff shows
affirmatively that there was no intervening negligence in
the handling of the beverage after it left the control and
management of the manufacturer. . . No case has been
brought to our attention in which recovery has been allowed
upon mere proof of an explosion.4t
Since the plaintiff in the Roper case did not negative negligence
by herself or anyone else besides defendant, she was denied
the benefit of res ipsa, and since she alleged no specific acts of
negligence she was denied recovery. Since the plaintiff was com-
pletely innocent, the result may be thought to be harsh. How-
ever, it must be remembered that any one of several persons
could have negligently mishandled the bottle after it left de-
43. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc. v. Fischer, 201 P.2d 245 (Okla. 1948).
44. 336 Il1. App. 91, 82 N.E.2d 815 (1948).
45. Roper v. Dad's Root Beer Co., 336 Ill. App. 91, 95, 82 N.E.2d 815,
816 (1948).
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fendant's control. Certainly the Roper case represents the great
weight of authority. 6
4. Where the accident occurs after the defendant has relin-
quished control of the bottle, and where there is evidence that
the plaintiff, or some third party, has mistreated or changed
the condition of the bottle, res ipsa loquitur will not be applied.
Thus, where defendant showed by expert testimony by one of the
world's outstanding chemists on glass that the bottle which ex-
ploded had been jarred and fractured before the explosion, res
ipsa was not applicable47 The same result has been reached
where it was shown that a child had mishandled an unopened
bottle, 4 where the plaintiff had left the bottle in the trunk of
his car and driven thirty miles over rough roads,49 and where
the plaintiff admitted having tipped over the bottle by accident 0
D. EFFECT OF THE FACT THAT EVIDENCE OF THE TRUE CAUSE OF
THE ACCIDENT IS MORE READILY ACCESSIBLE TO THE DEFENDANT
THAN TO THE PLAINTIFF.
This requisite to the application of res ipsa loquitur has not
been recognized by all the courts which apply the doctrine.
Prosser has severely criticized its use as ever being a controlling
factor in denying the plaintiff the benefit of the doctrne, because
if the circumstances of the accident are such as to create a rea-
sonable inference of negligence, "it cannot be supposed that the
inference ever would be defeated by a showing that the de-
fendant knew nothing about what happened.' 51 He further points
46. Stewart et al. v. Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 50 Ariz. 60, 68 P.2d
952 (1937); Gerber v. Faber et al., 54 Cal. App.2d 674, 129 P.2d 485
(1942) ; Berkens v. Denver Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 109 Colo. 840, 122 P.2d
884 (1942) ; Slack v. Premier-Pabst Corp., 5 A.2d 516 (Del. Super. 1939);
Hughs v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 155 Fla. 299, 19 So.2d 862 (1944);
Piacun v. La. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. et al., 33 So.2d 421 (La. App. 1947);
Kees v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 239 Mo. App. 1080, 199 S.W.2d 76
(1947); Luciano v. John Morgan, Inc., 267 App. Div. 785, 45 N.Y. Supp.2d
502 (2d Dep't 1943); Dail v. Taylor, 151 N.C. 284, 66 S.E. 135 (1909);
Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc. v. Fischer, 201 Okla. 81, 201 P.2d 245 (1948) ;
Soter v. Griesedieck Western Brewing Co., 200 Okla. 302, 193 P.2d 575
(1948).
47. Palmer v. Hygrade Water and Soda Co., et al., 236 Mo. App.247, 151
S.W.2d 548 (1941).
48. Hennings v. Thompson, 45 So.2d 755 (Fla. 1950); Loebig's Guardian
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 259 Ky. 124, 81 S.W.2d 910 (1935).
49. Dunn v. Hoffman Beverage Co., 126 N.J.L. 556, 20 A.2d 352 (1941).
50. Sweeney v. Blue Anchorage Beverage Co., 325 Pa. 216, 189 Atl. 331
(1937).
51. PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 301.
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out that if the facts of the accident do not give rise to an
inference of negligence, a plaintiff certainly could not gain
invocation by the court of the doctrine by showing that he knew
less about the accident than did his adversary.
Be this as it may, in bursting bottle cases the courts have put
some weight on the fact that in most instances the defendant
is in a better position to explain the true cause of the accident
than is the plaintiff. That fact in and of itself does not often
give rise to an application of res ipsa, but, when coupled with
fulfillment of the other requisites, the courts offer it as a reason
for the existence of the doctrine. Thus, in Stolle v. Anheuser
Busch, Inc., where plaintiff showed the explosion of a bottle
of beer, the resulting injury, and proof that no one besides de-
fedant had been negligent, the Supreme Court of Missouri
stated that applying res ipsa "is fair to the manufacturer, and
will afford the cusomers . . . reasonable protection, while a
contrary rule leaves them practically without redress,"12 since
plaintiff would have a very difficult time proving specific acts
of negligence, due to the fact that defendant, and only de-
fendant, has knowledge of the facts which might explain the
accident. In Stephens v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 3 the court,
in discussing res ipsa, declared:
'In a res ipsa loquitur case, owing to the fact that such
accidents as the one involved herein ordinarily do not occur
without negligence of defendant, and because the proof
is more accessible to defendant, plaintiff, in order to make
out a prima facie case, need only show generally that he was
injured as a result of some negligence of defendant, with-
out pleading and proving what particular or specific negli-
gence it was that caused the injury.5 4
These two cases suggest that the fact that the explanation of the
cause of the accident is more accessible to defendant than to
52. 307 Mo. 520, 271 S.W. 497, 500 (1925). Actually the theory of this
case, in allowing an application of res ipsa loquitur, has been overruled by
a later Missouri decision. [Maybach v. FalThaff Brewing Corp., 359 Mo.
446, 222 S.W.2d 87 (1947)]. However, the Maybach case allowed recovery
where the facts were essentially the same as they are here, such recovery
being allowed on the theory of an action for general negligence rather than
on res ipsa grounds. The Stolle case represents the weight of authority.
53. 215 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. App. 1948). The discussion included in note 52
supra applies to this case also.
54. Stephens v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of St. Louis, 215 S.W. 50 (Mo.
App. 1948).
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plaintiff, is not a conditian precedent to the invocation of the
doctrine, but rather an explanation of the policy underlying the
doctrine.5 Other cases support this view 6
IV. EFFECT OF SIMILAR ACCIDENTS INVOLVING DEFENDANT'S
PRODUCT
Discussion thus far has been restricted primarily to cases
involving an isolated explosion of a single bottle of carbonated
beverage. Is the fact that other bottles of defendant's product
have exploded a factor to be considered? The answer to this
question must be in the affirmative. In general, when plaintiff
offers evidence of the explosion of other bottles containing
defendant's product, an inference of negligence arises sufficient
to take the case to the jury.
The Court of Appeals of Tenessee, in Boykin v. Chase Bottling
Works, 57 has handed down an exceptionally well written opinion
in a case involving the effect of evidence of the explosion of other
bottles containing defendant's product. The facts of the Boykin
case may be summarized as follows: Defendant delivered its
product, Double-Cola, to plaintiff's place of business on a
Wednesday. After that time and before the bottle exploded on
the following Sunday, an ice man placed a 50 lb. block of ice
on top of the bottles. It was also shown that adult customers
were allowed to remove bottles from the cooler. On the follow-
ing Sunday, a customer having asked for a bottle of defendant's
product, plaintiff removed the bottle, and it exploded in her
hand, causing a severe injury to her hand and wrist. At the
trial plaintiff testified generally that she and and all others
who handled the bottle were careful. In the first count of her
declaration, plaintiff had alleged a specific act of negligence
55. In Curley v. Ruppert, 272 App. Div. 441, 71 N.Y. S.2d 578 (1st Dep't
1948), plaintiff proved sufficient facts to be entitled to benefit of res ipsa
loquitur by the majority rule, but was refused benefit of the doctrine on the
ground that evidence as to the true cause of the accident was in his pos-
session rather than that of the defendant, i.e., plaintiff had fragments of
the broken bottle, and the court said that plaintiff should have had these
analyzed to ascertain whether the bottle was defective; since the plaintiff
failed to avail himself of this opportunity, he was denied the benefit of
res ipsa.
56. Ortego et al. v. Nehi Bottle Works et al., 199 La. 599, 6 So.2d 677
(1942); Lanza v. De Ridder Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 3 So.2d 217 (La. App.
1941); Auzenne v. Gulf Pub. Service Co., 188 So. 51 (La App. 1939);
Seven-Up Bottling Co., Inc. v. Gretes, 182 Va. 138, 27 S.E.2d 925 (1943);
Joly v. Jones, 55 A.2d 181 (Vt. 1947).
57. 222 S.W.2d 889 (Tenn. App. 1949).
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(overcharging of bottles), and in addition sought recovery
under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. In the second count, she
reiterated the averments of the first count, and charged, in ad-
dition, another specific act of negligence, i.e., that defendant
used defective bottles. On count number one, the case was sent
to the injury, which found for the defendant; on count number
two, the court directed a verdict for the defendant. This judg-
ment was affirmed on appeal.
The Tennessee court pointed out that the fact that plaintiff
alleged a specific act of negligence on the part of defendant did
not in and of itself deny plaintiff the benefit of the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur. The court went on to say that while res ipsa
was formerly held inapplicable to cases involving bursting
bottles, the weight of authority now holds the doctrine appli-
cable where negligent handling of the bottle by everyone besides
defendant has been negatived. However, in the Boykin case,
plaintiff's testimony on this point was vague and unsatisfactory.
The court further pointed out that the mere explosion of a bottle
and an injury is not sufficient to give rise to an application
of the doctrine. However, said the court:
When, in addition to circumstances attending the injury, it
is shown that other bottles filled and marketed by the same
bottler under substantially the same conditions exploded,
and such occurrences are not too remote in point of time,
it is held that a prima facie case of liability is made out,
requiring the issue of defendant's negligence to be sub-
mitted to the jury.5 8
The court pointed out that courts so holding do so, not on the
ground that a res ipsa case has been made out, but rather on the
ground that in such cases the circumstances immediately con-
nected with the injury are considered along with other cir-
cumstances pertinent to the issue in order to ascertain whether,
when all taken together, they are sufficient in probative value
to make a question for the jury.5 9
LMany courts make the statement that the basis for applying
the res ipsa doctrine is the fact of the injury itself. But the
court in the Boykin case points out that the basis should be the
circumstances immediately attending the injury. In that case
not only were the circumstances immediately attending the
58. Id. at 894.
59. Ibid.
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injury shown, but, in addition, the explosion of other bottles
was offered in evidence. The court held that this evidence
could be sufficient in probative value to furnish a basis for an
inference of negligence. If so, the jury may, or may not draw
the inference. And if they do, they may consider it along with
all the other evidence, in determining where the preponderance
lies.
Thus, says the Tennessee court, in determining the probative
value of the particular circumstances in a particular case, the
circumstances should be tested by the principles of the res ipsa
doctrine without regard to whether that doctrine is applied
eo nominee.
The Boykin case, then, seems to agree with Prosser's view
that the res ipsa doctrine is merely a label used to describe one
kind of circumstantial evidence case, and that there are varying
degrees of circumstantial evidence, some of which do not fall
exactly within the limits of the res ipsa doctrine, and others
which do. Thus, where plaintiff merely shows that a bottle ex-
ploded and that he was injured thereby, this evidence alone will
not entitle him to the benefit of the doctrine. If the plaintiff
goes further and establishes that from the time the defendant
relinquished control until the time of the injury no one mis-
handled the bottle, he will normally be allowed the benefit of the
doctrine. But when paintiff shows in addition to the proof
set out above, that other bottles of defendant's product ex-
ploded under substantially the same conditions and not too
remotely in point of time, plaintiff normally will not need the
benefit of res ipsa, and, as pointed out in the Boykin case, he has
shown enough to take the case to the jury irrespective of the
rule of res ipsa. This is not a difference in kind but rather
in degree. It is not that a straight circumstantial evidence case
is a different kind of case from a res ipsa loquitur case. It is
only that there are more circumstances there than in the strict
res ipsa situation. It would seem that the only basis for the
application of res ipsa as a separate doctrine, at least by those
courts which recognize that res ipsa is a form of circumstantial
evidence, is the feeling of a need to justify allowing the jury
to draw an inference where the circumstances do not indicate
the likelihood of the inference so clearly, or at least so directly,
as they usually must.
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Other cases support this reasoning. Thus, in Merchant v.
Columbia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 0 where plaintiff was injured
by the explosion of a bottle of defendant's products, it was held
that evidence of the explosion of other bottles charged and dis-
tributed by the same bottler at about the same time was suf-
ficient to send the case to the jury on the issue of defendant's
negligence.61 And where more than one bottle of a group ex-
plodes at substantially the same time, this is generally held to
be an even stronger case of circumstantial evidence, and such
a case is usually submitted to the jury without reference to the
res ipsa doctrine. So in Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Shelton,62
where twenty-seven bottles of defendant's product exploded
in one place on a particular afternoon, this evidence was held
to make out a prima facie case of negligence on the part of
the defendant. This view is amply supported.63
It seems evident then, that circumstantial evidence appears in
varying degrees, sometimes insufficient to merit an application
of res ipsa, sometimes sufficient for its application, and some-
times determinative enough so that such evidence alone makes
out a prima facie case of negligence against the defendant,
without the necessity of an application of the doctrine.
V. PROCEDURAL EFFECT OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR IN
BURSTING BOTTLE CASES
Once the lplaintiff has shown himself entitled to the benefit of
the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the question
arises as to how strong a case it affords the plaintiff.
The majority of American courts hold that res ipsa furnishes
an inference of negligence against the defendant . 4 A res ipsa
60. 214 S.C. 206, 51 S.E.2d 749 (1949).
61. See Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Asheville, 228 N.C. 32, 44
S.E.2d 337 (1947); Ashkenazi v. Nehi Bottling Co., 217 N.C. 552, 8 S.E.2d
818 (1940) ; Dail v. Taylor, 151 N.C. 284, 66 S.E. 135 (1909).
62. 214 Ky. 118, 282 S.W. 778 (1926).
63. Merchant v. Columbia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 214 S.C. 206, 51 S.E.2d
749 (1949); Graham et al. v. Cloar, 30 Tenn. App. 306, 205 S.W.2d 764
(1947) ; Stroud v. Brands Punch Syrup Co. et al., 205 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1947).
64. Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal.2d 514, 203 P.2d 522 (1949);
Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944);
Honea v. City Dairy, Inc., 22 Cal.2d 614, 140 P.2d 369 (1943) ; Canada Dry
Ginger Ale Co., Inc. v. Jochum, 43 A.2d 42 (D.C. App. 1945); Bradley v.
Conway Springs Bottling Co., 154 Kan. 282, 118 P.2d 601 (1941); Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Shelton, 214 Ky. 118, 282 S.W. 778 (1926); Cole v.
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 15 So.2d 543 (La. App. 1941); Ruffin v. Coca-Cola
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instruction to the jury following the majority rule points out
that both the burden of persuasion and the burden of producing
evidence remain with the plaintiff; that from the evidence the
jury may infer that defendant was negligent; that this inference
is a permissive, not a mandatory one; that the inference, though
established, may be rebutted by the defendant. Thus in Counts
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of St. Louis, where the plaintiff showed
himself entitled to a res ipsa instruction, an instruction to the
effect that the jury was "at liberty to infer that defendant was
negligent" was sustained on appeal.6 5
Very few courts treat the res ipsa doctrine as giving rise
to a presumption, requiring a directed verdict for plaintiff
unless defendant rebuts it, which would in effect shift the burden
of producing evidence to defendant . 6 In Lanza v. De Ridder
Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,67 the court said:
Under our law, in the opinion of this court, when the
plaintiff has thus proved that the bottle of Coca-Cola had
not been opened or tempered with or improperly handled
from the time it left the possession of the defendant com-
pany until the time it exploded in the hand of the plaintiff
while she was in the act of lifting the bottle from the ice box
to hand to a customer, through no negligence on her part,
then a prima facie case has been established and the burden
is then on the defendant company, under the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur, to rebut the presumption that the explo-
sion arose from some defect or some negligence in its manu-
facture and preparation.s
Even in those jurisdictions where an invocation of the res
ipsa rule results in a rebuttable presumption shifting the burden
Bottling Co., 311 Mass. 514, 42 N.E.2d 259 (1942); Maybach v. Falstaff
Brewing Corp., 359 Mo. 446, 222 S.W.2d 87 (1949); Stolle v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 307 Mo. 520, 271 S.W. 497 (1925); Kees v. Canada Dry Ginger
Ale Co., Inc., 239 Mo. App. 1080, 199 S.W.2d 76 (1947); Brunskill v.
Farabi, 181 S.W.2d 549 (Mo. App. 1944); Palmer v. Hygrade Water &
Soda Co., 236 Mo. App. 247, 151 S.W.2d 548 (1941) ; Markowitz v. Liebert
and Obert, 23 N.J. Misc. 281, 43 A.2d 794 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Macon Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Crane, 211 N.C. 567, 190 S.E. 879 (1937); Fick v.
Pilsener Brewing Co., 39 Ohio App. 158, 86 N.E.2d 616 (1949); Boykin v.
Chase Bottling Works, 222 S.W.2d 889 (Tenn. App. 1949) ; Winfree v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Works, 20 Tenn. App. 615, 103 S.W.2d 33 (1937); Honea v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 143 Tex. 272, 183 S.W.2d 968 (1944) ; Berkendorfer
et al. v. Garrett et al., 143 S.W.2d 1020 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
65. 149 S.W.2d 418 (Mo. App. 1941).
66. Piacun v. La. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 33 So.2d 421 (La. App. 1947);
Alagood v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 135 S.W.2d 1056 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
67. 3 So.2d 217 (La. App. 1941).
68. Id. at 219.
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of producing evidence to the defendant, no court has gone any
further, and the defendant always has an opportunity to rebut
the presumption against him.
VI. CONCLUSION
The rules generally applicable in other res ipsa cases apply
as well in cases involving injuries sustained through the burst-
ing of a bottle. Several generalizations may be fairly made.
A. The courts regard the explosion of a bottle as an accident
normally the result of negligence on the part of someone.
B. Most bottles burst after the defendant bottler has relin-
quished control over and possession of the bottle. Thus,
in order to focus the inference of negligence on the de-
fendant, the plaintiff must show that neither he, nor
anyone else, negligently handled the bottle after it left
the defendant's control. If he is unable to do so, he will
not get the benefit of the doctrine.
C. The fact that the evidence of the true cause of the acci-
dent is more readily accessible to the defendant than to
the plaintiff may be said to be an explanation of the
necessity for such a doctrine rather than a condition
precedent to its application.
D. Where the plaintiff shows that other bottles of the de-
fendant have exploded, with further proof that those
explosions happened at approximately the same time
and under substantially the same conditions as the acci-
dent complained of, the courts have held that plaintiff
has made out a cause of action for general negligence
and that application of the res ipsa doctrine is unneces-
sary. It would seem, however, that there is no difference
in kind between the two types of cases, since res ipsa
is itself only a special application of the rules of cir-
cumstantial evidence.
E. As in other cases where the doctrine is applied, res ipsa
results in a permissive, not a mandatory, inference of
negligence. Both the burden of producing evidence and
the burden of persuasion are thought by most courts
to remain with the plaintiff, although a few courts would
direct a verdict for the plaintiff if he makes out a res
ipsa case and defendant introduces no evidence.
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